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TAX LAW: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
FILM AND SOUND RECORDING DEPRECIATION,
1984-1986 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In our universe even stars wear out. Thus a "bronze Grammy"' and
even a "tin Oscar" 2 brought a golden moment of satisfaction to our fa-
vorite contestants, the sound recording and film production companies,
under the Tax Reform Act of 1984.3 But Oscar's countenance will
leaden, and Grammy will tarnish, if Congress decides to enact the 1985
House and Senate tax committee proposals4 to treat motion pictures,
videotapes5 and sound recordings as intangible property for purposes of
Internal Revenue Code section 167.6
1. The phrases were coined by J. Eustice in J. EUsTICE, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984,
A SELECTIVE ANALYSIS 5-45 (1984) ["EUSTICE"]. The sound recording industry garnered a
"bronze Grammy" since Congress granted sound recording owners the option to elect the very
favorable 3-year recovery property depreciation through new Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)
§ 48(r); the less generous § 167 straight line and accelerated methods for tangible property still
remain available.
Section 48(r)(1) states that "[flor purposes of this title [Internal Revenue Code], in the
case of any sound recording, the original use of which commences with the taxpayer, the
taxpayer may elect to treat such recording as recovery property which is 3-year property to the
extent that the taxpayer has an ownership interest in such recording." I.R.C. § 48(r)(1) (West
Supp. 1986).
To compare depreciation methods, see infra notes 31, 35 and accompanying text.
2. The 98th Congress awarded the film industry a "tin Oscar" in that it disallowed fur-
ther use of the very favorable five-year "Accelerated Cost Recovery System" (ACRS) deprecia-
tion method (set forth in I.R.C. § 168 (1982)) by enacting new § 168(e)(5), which states that
"Itihe term 'recovery property' [i.e. property qualifying for ACRS treatment] shall not include
any motion picture film or video tape." I.R.C. § 168(e)(5) (West Supp. 1986).
At the same time it did leave open the use of the accelerated tangible property methods set
forth in I.R.C. § 167 (1982). EuSTICE, supra note 1. For § 167 depreciation methods, see infra
notes 6, 31 and accompanying text. For general discussion of the § 168 ACRS methods, see
infra note 31 and accompanying text. For implications of new § 168(e)(5), see infra text ac-
companying note 65.
3. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Div. A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, § 113, 98 Stat. 494, 635-38.
4. H.R. 1800, § 109(c), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1630, H1636 (daily ed.
March 28, 1985); S. 814, § 109(c), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S3687, S3693 (daily
ed. March 28, 1985).
The proposed amendment is to I.R.C. § 167(c) (1982), the subsection that limits the appli-
cation of accelerated depreciation methods (see infra note 68 and accompanying text) to tangi-
ble property. The amendment proposed in § 109(c) of the companion House and Senate bills
adds at the end of § 167(c) the following new sentence: "For purposes of the preceding sen-
tence, any motion picture film, video tape, or sound recording shall be treated as intangible
property." 131 CONG. REC. H1636, S3693.
5. In this paper, "film" includes motion picture and television film, and videotapes.
6. Section 167(a) (1982) provides:
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Even the tax code acknowledges that things wear out. The general
depreciation provision is set forth in Internal Revenue Code section
167(a): "[t]here shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reason-
able allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence)-( 1) of property used in the trade or busi-
ness, or (2) of property held for the production of income."7 In our case,
the initial creative work that goes into a motion picture or sound record-
ing is preserved on a "master negative"' or "master tape,"9 respectively.
These masters are paid for by producers in the trade, or financed by
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the
exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)--
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
In the case of recovery property (within the meaning of section 168), the deduction
allowable under section 168 shall be deemed to constitute the reasonable allowance
provided by this section ....
Section 167(b) (1982) states:
For taxable years ending after December 31, 1953, the term "reasonable allowance"
as used in subsection (a) shall include (but shall not be limited to) an allowance
computed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treas-
ury], under any of the following methods:
(1) the straight line method,
(2) the declining balance method, using a rate not exceeding twice the rate
which would have been used had the annual allowance been computed under the
method described in paragraph (1),
(3) the sum of the years-digits method, and
(4) any other consistent method. . . which. . . does not, during the first two-
thirds of the useful life of the property, exceed the total of such allowances which
would have been used had such allowances been computed under the method de-
scribed in paragraph (2).
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit or reduce an allowance other-
wise allowable under subsection (a).
Section 167(c) (1982) states that:
"[p]aragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (b) shall apply only in the case of prop-
erty (other than intangible property) described in subsection (a) with a useful life of 3
years or more- . . (2) acquired after December 31, 1953, if the original use of such
property commences with the taxpayer and commences after such date.
Thus if films and sound recordings are treated as intangible property, the declining balance,
sum of the years-digits and equivalent accelerated methods will no longer be available. Only
the more modest benefits of § 167's straight line method will remain. To compare results, see
infra note 31, Tables 1-2.
7. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982).
8. Diagram offilm manufacturing process, excerpted from Walt Disney Prods. v. United
States, 549 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1976) (Disney III).
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(A)
The cut-picture negative and magnetic master sound tape are the property for which
Disney claims the investment tax credit and will be referred to collectively as the "master
negative."
(B)
Intermediate printing articles include duplicate negatives, matrixes, color reversal
internegatives, and other articles derived from the cut-picture negative, These articles and the
optical sound negatives constitute the "completion negatives."
(C)
The optical sound negative can be combined with either the cut-picture negative
itself or with the intermediate printing articles to produce the exhibition prints.
In Bing Crosby Prods. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979), the court set forth
the manufacturing process in some detail:
The manufacturing of the prints which are actually shown to the public should be
viewed in a vertical framework. For explanation purposes, a three-step analysis best
serves to illustrate this:
Step (1): When a program or movie is shot, the video and audio portions are
each recorded and then edited separately. The sound portion consists of three parts
(dialogue, music, and sound effects) which are combined and edited into a finished
version referred to as the master sound tape or magnetic master. The visual portion
is edited into a cut picture negative which is also referred to as the original picture
1986]
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negative. These final edited versions of the audio and visual portions are called the
master negatives or simply the negative elements.
Step (2): From the respective master negatives, various intermediate or secon-
dary film and tape articles are made. These consist of 16 and 35mm negatives of the
video portion (duplicate picture negatives or duplicate action negatives). The sound
portion is recorded on 16 and 35mm tapes (optical sound track negatives). Although
they actually go a step further by combining the sound and picture, answer prints
and protective masters are included within this category. Also included are various
duplicate sound tapes which are made and retained by the production companies.
The distinguishing feature of this category is that the films and tapes contained
within it are generally the ones which are either used by the company to manufacture
the release prints in step # 3, or are items which are made from the master negatives
and retained by the company to make other intermediate printing articles.
Step (3): The final step involves the actual manufacture of the release prints
(exhibit or composite release prints). These combine the audio and visual portions
onto a single property, which are then shown at movie theaters, by television net-
works, or by individual television stations. The release prints are generally struck
from the different intermediate articles contained within step # 2.
Id. at 1294-95.
Some companies (e.g. Walt Disney and MCA) use the intermediate and answer prints so
extensively in the manufacturing process that they quickly wear out, as do all release prints.
Id. at 1295. For example, for the 1970 tax year Disney did not claim costs for ITC or depreci-
ation purposes beyond the production of the answer print [Step 2] viewed by executives. Also,
exhibition print costs [Step 3] and wear and tear were expensed instead of depreciated. Disney
ll, 549 F.2d 576 at 580 n.3. In calculating the cost basis for depreciation of the film titles,
Disney did not include the costs of the intermediate visual prints used to produce the answer
print, but it did include the costs of producing the film master negative and magnetic master
sound tape, and the optical sound negative [Step 1]. These costs included expenses for prepar-
ing a script from a story, building sets, hiring and rehearsing talent, editing the original film
negatives, and mixing the audio. Id. at 580 n.2.
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outside investors. They are concededly physical;"° the question is
whether they are tangible for depreciation purposes.
Since the film and sound masters are used to produce a copyrighted
end product and a copyright is an intangible right,' one can argue that













(ALBUMS AND Retail AND 4-TRACK
SINGLES) Products) CASSETTES
*The master tape is a magnetic tape which contains two tracks of sound for stereo separa-
tion. The master tape is the property for the costs of which Capitol claims the investment tax
credit.
Brief for Appellees at A-7, EMI North America Holdings, Capitol Industries-EMI, and Capi-
tol Records v. United States, 675 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1982).
10. In Walt Disney Prods. v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 189, 192 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (Dis-
ney I), the trial court noted that "the motion picture negatives here certainly are tangible-
weighing between 27 and 51 pounds, between 5000 and 11,800 feet in length and capable of
being seen and touched." In the more recent case Walt Disney Prods. v. United States, 1975-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9824 at 88,633 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (Disney III), the trial court noted
that "[t]he parties have stipulated that the [film] negatives are tangible personal property."
11. Section 202 of the Copyright Law states:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in
which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted
work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does tranfer of
ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey prop-
erty rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
1986]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
the cost of the intangible property includes all production costs. The Sec-
retary of the Treasury took this position in Treasury Regulations section
1.48-1(f), which concerns the application of the Investment Tax Credit
("ITC") to motion picture and television film masters.' 2 Even if the mas-
ters were held to be intangible, Treasury Regulations section 1.167(a)-3
still provides that "an intangible asset may be the subject of a deprecia-
tion allowance" if the length of its use "can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy."'3  But more to the point, the trial court in the first of three
cases styled Walt Disney Prods. v. United States1 4 explicitly rejected the
thesis in Regulation 1.48-1(0 that the costs of producing a film are intan-
gible because the copyright is intangible:
When the Secretary [of the Treasury] includes in cost of
copyright or patents, the "costs of purchasing or producing the
item patented or copyrighted," he misconstrues the very nature
of patents and copyrights.
A copyright, when secured in accordance with applicable
laws is the right to multiply copies of a literary, intellectual or
artistic property. Nowhere in the constitutional or statutory
scheme does the law create a right by copyright in the property.
It is an incorporeal (intangible) right existing independently
from the corporeal (tangible) property out of which it arises.' 5
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(f) states that
[t]he cost of intangible property, in the case of a patent or copyright, includes all
costs of purchasing or producing the item patented or copyrighted. Thus, in the case
of a motion picture or television film or tape, the cost of the intangible property
includes manuscript and screenplay costs, the cost of wardrobe and set design, the
salaries of cameramen, actors, directors, etc., and all other costs properly includible
in the basis of such film or tape.
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(0); T.D. 6731, 1964-1 C.B. 11, 38.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3; T.D. 6500, 25 Fed. Reg. 11,402, 11,533 (1960).
14. Walt Disney Prods. v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd as modi-
fied, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974) (Disney I); Walt Disney
Prods. v. United States, 1974-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9623 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dis-
missed per stipulation, No. 74-2988 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1975) (Disney ]]); Walt Disney Prods. v.
United States, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9824 at 88,632 (C.D. Cal. 1975), affd in part
and rem'd in part, 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1976) (Disney III); Bing Crosby Prods. v. United
States, 588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979); Hanna Barbera Prods. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9365 (C.D. Cal. 1977). Compare Texas Instruments v. United States, 551 F.2d
559 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that master tapes on which seismic information was recorded are
tangible property).
The cases were collected by Wm. P. McClure in his 22-page opinion letter to Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury J. E Chapoton, dated February 23, 1983, Treas. Doc. No. 83-2082
(published in Tax Notes Today, March 14, 1983). He wrote on behalf of nine member compa-
nies of the Motion Picture Association of America, advocating the tangibility of film master
negatives for depreciation and Investment Tax Credit purposes.
15. Disney L 327 F. Supp. at 192 (emphasis in original).
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In the three Disney cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sistently overruled Treasury Regulation 1.48-1(f) as applied to films.
16
The Disney cases and their progeny, 17 and the subsequent EMI case con-
cerning sound recordings, 18 have all dealt exclusively with the question
of tangibility as applied to qualification for the ITC, which is the focus of
Regulation 1.48-1(f).1 Nevertheless, members of Congress, the Califor-
nia senators P. Wilson (R.) and A. Cranston (D.) among them, appear to
have relied on the same legal principles enunciated in these ITC cases to
evaluate the tangibility of films and sound recordings for depreciation
purposes.2 °
In Disney ,21 and later in Disney II and J11,22 the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service had disallowed Disney's claim for the In-
vestment Tax Credit on the theory that Disney's production costs were
investments in intangible property, namely a copyright protected motion
picture. Throughout this line of cases, the courts agreed with the Dis-
trict Court's 1971 holding in Disney I that master film negatives were
16. Disney III, 549 F.2d at 581.
17. The rationale for the government's persistence is the doctrine of separable facts, as set
forth in Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). A prior judgment acts as collateral estoppel
only as to those matters in the second proceeding which were actually presented and deter-
mined in the first suit. Thus if a dispute arises with respect to a subsequent tax year, the prior
judgment is conclusive only "if the very same facts and no others are involved in the second
case." Id. at 601.
This proposition was cited by the Disney III trial court, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9824
at 88,633. Of course, the doctrine of res judicata would govern claims raised in a subsequent
proceeding but involving the same claim in the same tax year. Disney III at 88,633. The trial
court noted, "[tihe parties have stipulated that the [film] negatives are tangible personal prop-
erty." Disney III at 88,633 n.3.
18. EMI North America Holdings v. United States, 675 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1982). See
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
19. Specific ITC provisions are outside the scope of this Note. For a discussion of its wax-
ing and waning popularity as a device to stimulate business from 1961 to the present, see J.
FREELAND, S. LIND AND R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
785 (1985).
Section 211 of the "Tax Reform Bill of 1985," H.R. 3838, passed by the House on De-
cember 19, 1985, abolishes the ITC. 131 CONG. REC. H12597 (daily ed., December 17, 1985).
Section II. C. of Senate Finance Committee Chairman Packwood's (R.-Or.) Markup Proposal
contains the same provision. Telephone conference with Senate Finance Committee staff.
March 20, 1986. (Full text of the March 21, 1986 Joint Committee Print (JCS-8-86) is printed
at Tax Notes Today, March 21, 1986.)
20. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
21. Disney , 327 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd as modified, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974).
22. Walt Disney Prods. v. United States, 1974-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9623 (C.D. Cal.
1974), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 74-2988 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1975); Walt Disney
Prods. v. United States, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 4' 9824 at 88.632 (C.D. Cal. 1975). aJffd
and rem'd, 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1976).
1986]
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tangible personal property within the meaning of the ITC property defi-
nitions, and that accordingly the Disney company could claim the ITC
for the production costs of these audio and visual film masters.
In Disney III, the government reasoned that since Disney had used
the income forecast method of depreciation, "that property should like-
wise be treated as an intangible for ITC purposes."23 The court conceded
that the income forecast method was "generally used for depreciating
intangible personal property." 4 But since Disney's use of this method
was not decisive,25 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a "machine which
stamps out patented products for sale is tangible. The character of the
acquisition costs of that machine is not affected by the character of the
end product, even if the value of the entire system is dependent on...
an intangible."26 So even though motion picture production companies
do secure a statutory copyright on the sequence of images and sound to
preserve the value of exhibition rights, the cut-picture and sound nega-
tives (the "machine") that produce that intangible property are tangible.
As the trial court in Disney III characterized the dispute,
[t]he government's argument that Disney is not investing
in tangible personal property, but rather in the intangible copy-
right, was squarely rejected by the [Ninth Circuit] Court of Ap-
peals. In effect, the government would have this Court
resurrect Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(f) struck down in Disney I,
which could have allocated the costs of production to the intan-
gible copyright. The Court declines to do so. 27
But in two major pieces of tax legislation, the "Tax Reform Act of
1984" and the "Technical Corrections Bill of 1985,"28 two influential tax
committee leaders, former (Ninety-eighth Congress) Senate Finance
Committee Chairman R. Dole (R.-Kan.) and House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Rep. D. Rostenkowski (D.-Ill.), appear to have re-
jected the extension of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning on film and sound
recording master tangibility for ITC purposes, governed generally by In-
ternal Revenue Code sections 38 through 48, to tangibility for purposes
of depreciation. Depreciation is governed generally by sections 167 and
168 of the Internal Revenue Code.
23. Disney III, 549 F.2d at 281.
24. Id. at 580.
25. Id. at 581.
26. Id.
27. Disney III, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9824 at 88,634.
28. See infra note 56, Tax Reform Act of 1984, note 67, Technical Corrections Bill of
1985, and accompanying text.
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In Internal Revenue Code subsections 167(b)(1) through (b)(4),2 9
the Congress has set forth the three most common depreciation computa-
tion methods: straight line, declining balance and sum of the years-digits.
Under the straight line method, the simplest, an asset with a 10-year life
loses 1/10 of that value each year: in year two it is worth 9/10, in year
three 8/10 and so on. This regular decline in value would appear graphi-
cally as a "straight" line.3°
The other two methods "accelerate" the deductions, in that they
provide larger deductions than straight line in the early years. 3' Here the
film or sound recording producer benefits because the higher early depre-
ciation deduction enables it to retain more of the income the property is
29. I.R.C. § 167(b)(l)-(4) (1982). For text of statute see supra note 6.
30. In present practice, with straight line depreciation the residual salvage value is usually
subtracted before the fractions are computed. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-i, T.D. 6500, 25 Fed.
Reg. 11,402, 11,532-33 (1960); modified, T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 106, 108, T.D. 7203, 1972-2
C.B. 12, 30.
Section 201(b)(3) of H.R. 3838, the "Tax Reform Bill of 1985," provides that for tangible
assets placed in service after December 31, 1985, salvage value will be treated as zero. H.R.
3838, 131 CONG. REC. H12589 (daily ed. December 17, 1985).
31.
TABLE 1. Effective depreciation rates as a percentage of initial basis in a 5-year time frame.
No adjustment for salvage value.
YEAR Straight-line 200% DB SYD 150% DB 5yr ACRS 3yr ACRS
1 20% 40 33 30 15 25
2 20 24 27 11 22 38
3 20 14 20 9 21 37
4 20 9 13 8 21
5 20 5 6 7 21
total 100 90 100 64 100 100
TABLE 2. Effective depreciation rates as a percentage of initial basis in a 10-year time frame.
[Adjustment for 10% salvage value]
YEAR Straight-line 200% DB SYD 150% DB 5yr ACRS 3yr ACRS
1 10%[9] 20 18 15 15 25
2 10 [9] 16 16 13 22 38
3 10 [9] 13 15 11 21 37
4 10 [9] 10 13 9 21
5 10 [9] 8 11 8 21
6 10 [9] 7 9 7
7 10 [9] 5 7 6
8 10 [9] 4 6 5
9 10 [9] 3 4 4
10 10 [9] 1 2 3
total 100% 100* 100 81 100 100
*Actual sum is 101, due to rounding.
Notes to Tables I and 2. SYD stands for "'sum of the years-digits.'" DB stands for "de-
clining balance."
100% DB would yield the same result as straight line. Any percentage between 100"C
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producing at an earlier time than it could with the straight line method.
But these three methods share a common difficulty: the production com-
pany must estimate the asset's useful life in advance. Furthermore, these
three formulas yield an annual deduction fixed in advance, while the ac-
tual revenues can vary widely from year to year.
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") addressed this problem in a
1960 Revenue Ruling on television films.3" The solution was subse-
quently applied to motion picture films and sound recordings.33 The IRS
observed that since the income actually produced from year to year de-
termines the usefulness of a film or tape in the taxpayer's business, a
more accurate depreciation method would follow the income flow and
not a hypothetical useful life.34
The proposed solution was the "income forecast" method, where
the production company estimates the total income the film or sound
recording will produce. This amount becomes the denominator in a frac-
tion whose numerator is the current year's income. This fraction times
the total cost of the production masters equals the current year's depreci-
and 200% can be selected by the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 167(b)(2), T.D. 6500, 25 Fed. Reg. 11,402,
11,537-38 (1960), modified, T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 106, 109.
Computation formulas are set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-I through 1.167(b)-3, T.D.
6500, 25 Fed. Reg. 11,402, 11,536-41 (1960), modified, T.D. 6712, 1964-1 C.B. 106, 109.
The 3-year and 5-year ACRS recovery property depreciation schedules are essentially
equivalent to 3- and 5-year straight line, with a slight discount in year 1 to compensate for the
very generous statutory equivalent to a 3-year or 5-year useful life. I.R.C. § 168(b)(1) (1982).
Chirelstein explains that
the newer, "accelerated" methods concentrated larger deductions in the earlier years
of the asset's life and thus effected a speedier return of the greater part of the tax-
payer's cost. Generally, as compared with the straight-line approach, the accelerated
methods permitted deduction of about one-half the cost of an asset during the first
third of its useful life, and about two-thirds of the cost over the first half of that life.
M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 6.07 p. 133 (3d ed. 1982) ["CHIREL-
STEIN"]. A business person should buy a machine when the "present value of the expected
after-tax revenues generated by the machine excee[d], or [fall] short of, the required investment
.... .CHIRELSTEIN at 133.
32. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68.
33. Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62 (motion picture film); Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B.
91, 92 (sound recording).
34. The Treasury noted that the income distortion on tax returns was:
caused by a strikingly uneven flow of income, earned by groups of [television] pro-
grams within the series, resulting from contract restrictions, methods of distribution
and audience appeal of the programs. If the film series is a success, additional in-
come will be forthcoming from reruns over a period of years, depending upon its
popularity; whereas, unsuccessful film series may produce little or no income after
the initial exhibition.
Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68 (1960).
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ation deduction. 5 In years where contract restrictions, distribution
methods and audience appeal produce a small amount of income the de-
preciation deduction is proportionally small. The IRS concluded that
the income forecast formula provides an "acceptable method," but did
not go so far as to require its use.3 6 This was fortunate, since it is cum-
bersome in practice37 and the denominator, "total income," only dis-
guises the forecasting problem.
While the income forecast method admittedly provides a better
match 38 between current income and the current depreciation deduction,
it does not furnish a genuine solution to the problem of prognostication.
35.
TABLE 3. Income forecast depreciation method. Total income over life of film estimated at
$1,000; initial fixed production costs of $100.
Annual Annual Income as a % Depreciation Deduction as a %
Year Income of Est. Total Inc. of Initial Cost Basis
1 $ 300 30% 30%
2 150 15 15
3 200 20 20
4 200 20 20
5 150 15 15
Total $1,000 100% 100%
Year I depreciation deduction = 30% X $100 = $30.
Year 4 depreciation deduction = 20% X $100 = $20.
Computation formula is set forth at Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 69.
36. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 69.
Section 109(c)(1) of the Technical Corrections Bill of 1985, H.R. 1800 and S. 814, nar-
rows film depreciation options to a choice between the income forecast and straight line meth-
ods, by foreclosing selection of any of the tangible property accelerated methods set forth in
§ 167(b). Section 109(c)(1) provides:
Except with respect to property placed in service by the taxpayer on or before March
28, 1985, subsection (c) of section 167 (relating to limitations on use of certain meth-
ods and rates) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence:
"For purposes of the preceding sentence, any motion picture film, video tape, or
sound recording shall be treated as intangible property."
131 CONG. REC. H1636, S3693 (daily ed. March 28, 1985).
37. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
38. The income forecast method is consistent with the popular Haig-Simons definition of
income as "all accretions to an individual's net worth during the relevant accounting period."
On the Haig-Simons comprehensive tax base theory, see generally Cooper, The Taming of the
Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 659.
But ACRS for films can be justified under the three-part Surrey-Kennedy tax equity test. For
an application of the Surrey-Kennedy criteria to the motion picture industry, especially small
production companies, see generally Note, The Tax Reform Act of 1976 and Tax Incentivesfor
Motion Picture Investment. Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater. 58 S. CAL.. L. REV.
839 (1985) ["Tax Incentives"]. Testifying in support of the generous tax provisions in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.) suggested a three-part test first
proposed by Professor Surrey of Harvard:
I. Are there sufficient policy reasons to justify federal expenditures in this area,
whether through tax expenditures or direct subsidies?
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Instead, the difficult task of estimating "useful life" has been exchanged
for the arguably equal challenge of estimating "total income." The esti-
mator's challenge is economically determined: this "total income" must
be earned by the product over the period in which it remains "useful,"
i.e. producing income at a rate fast enough to overtake its own mainte-
nance costs. The sum of annual incomes over the useful period consti-
tutes "total income." In this sense the terms "useful life" and "total
income" are equivalent. For example, entertainment industry products
must promise a revenue stream that will justify the cost of striking new
release prints, i.e. new prints will be struck until that cost is more than
the anticipated revenue.
The challenge is also practical: a film or sound recording's audience
appeal is ultimately beyond the control of any producer, and audience
demand determines the useful life of the film or recording and the total
income realized over that time. Even when a company designs its prod-
uct around themes believed to have a broad and continued appeal, for
example a family film or a Christmas album, there is no guarantee the
product will succeed on initial release or in the future.39
With the income forecast method, if the creative work does not per-
form up to expectations, the anticipated depreciation deduction from its
initial fixed production costs will have to stretch over a longer period.
But if the film or sound recording does better than expected, the IRS can
argue that the taxpayer has been "able to depreciate more rapidly than it
should have [by] underestimating its income forecast (the denomina-
tor)."'  This actually happened to Walt Disney Productions.4  By
adopting the income forecast method the production company can avoid
a dispute with the IRS about useful life, but now it faces the double risk
of low income and a low depreciation deduction if the product performs
2. If there is a need for federal expenditures, can it be done most effectively and
efficiently through direct subsidies or through tax expenditures?
3. If tax expenditures are the best method, is the particular form of expenditure the
fairest and most efficient distribution of the tax subsidy?
Tax Incentives at 843. Because these criteria equate tax break expenditures and direct budget
expenditures, "[tihey force legislatures to ask whether... the government should be support-
ing the activity in question and . . . whether the proposed method of support is effective
.Tax Incentives at 843.
39. Only one out often films is successful; two break even and the other seven lose money.
Tax Incentives, supra note 38 at 846. "Films are financed and shot twelve to eighteen months
before they are released, in which time popular tastes may change." Id. at 860.
40. Disney 11, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9824 at 88,635.
41. Id. The IRS sought an adjustment to depreciation deductions previously allowed to
Walt Disney Productions on three 1970 master film negatives (see supra note 8) to include
unanticipated income from "world-wide television release, initial world-wide theatrical release
and possible theatrical re-release." Id.
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poorly, or the threat of tax deficiency if it does well. Since under the
income forecast method the "estimated income . . . should be based on
the conditions known to exist at the end of the period for which the
return is made,"4 2 the taxpayer practically guarantees himself the need
for an annual review and possible recalculation before filing each tax re-
turn. The guarantee is almost ironclad. Absent the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue's explicit consent to a change, the production com-
pany's election of the income forecast method for a particular film prop-
erty is binding for depreciation calculations in all subsequent years.43
The elusive nature of any future year's precise depreciation deduc-
tion also poses a problem of tax equity. Once useful life has been dis-
guised as total income, an otherwise knowledgeable taxpaying citizen (or
legislator) cannot easily evaluate the relative generosity of the film or
sound recording producer's depreciation tax benefit. Income forecast
formula results do not lend themselves to tabular comparison with fixed
percentages.' This is a drawback, since perceived fairness is at the
threshold of the tax equity issue.4 5
In 1981 the Congress appeared to offer the taxpayer some relief
from the problems of estimating useful life and total income, and defend-
ing these estimates from IRS challenge. The mechanism was new Code
section 168,46 which set forth an "Accelerated Cost Recovery System"
("ACRS") where eligible "recovery property" could be depreciated at
rates even more favorable than those available under section 167(b).
Here the acceleration was accomplished "by substituting sharply abbre-
viated depreciation schedules for the 'useful life' limitation that ha[d]
governed the depreciation allowance in the past.",4 7 The taxpayer was
allowed to deduct approximately twenty percent per year in the case of
five-year recovery property,48 which included motion picture films and
42. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 69.
43. See, e.g., Riester v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. 1985-46 (CCH) 621, 623 (initial election of
income forecast method by motion picture limited partnership was binding in future years).
44. Compare Tables 1 and 2 with Table 3, supra notes 31 and 35.
45. Congressman Siljander (R.-Mich.) remarked,
[T]he American people want ... a simple, fair tax system that requires everyone to
pay their fair share of taxes. The elite, through sophisticated tax lawyers and tax
loopholes can avoid paying taxes which leaves the massive burden on the middle-
income American.
130 CONG. REC. H2601 (daily ed. April 11, 1984).
46. I.R.C. § 168 (1982). Section 168(a) states that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction
for any taxable year the amount determined under this section with respect to recovery prop-
erty." The applicable percentages for the 3-year and 5-year classes of recovery property are set
forth supra at note 31, Tables I and 2.
47. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31 at 9 6.08 p. 139.
48. See supra note 31, Table I.
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video tapes.49 Now the production company could lock in an approxi-
mation to five-year straight line depreciation in advance, without refer-
ence to salvage value and without the burden of showing a proximate
relationship between this five-year period and the possibly longer service
life of the asset. Moreover, there was no need for annual recalculation of
the depreciation deduction depending on the fortuities of that year's
income.
While ACRS could be criticized, as could earlier class life systems,
on the grounds that the abbreviated useful lives were fictional," ° the prin-
ciple of fixed life has utility: the interested taxpayer or legislator had no
trouble comparing tax benefits because each type of property was to be
depreciated over a period determined in advance. The ACRS system was
extended to every major American industry."
But ACRS was very costly in terms of foregone tax revenue, so
much so that in the Tax Reform Act of 1984 Congress yielded to pres-
sure from the Treasury Department 52 and certain of its own tax commit-
tee members. 3 In its newfound zeal to reduce the budget deficit, to rein
49. I.R.C. § 168(c)(2)(B) (1982).This subsection states that "[t]he term '5-year property'
means recovery property which is section 1245 class property and which is not 3-year prop-
erty, 10-year property, or 15-year public utility property." Since films were never assigned a
class life they are not 3-year or 10-year property. Pursuant to § 1245, films are "personal
property. . . of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167."
I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(A) (1982).
50. The Disney I trial court observed that "[d]epreciation and its use as a 'tax shelter' has a
sufficient history to make one thing clear-that depreciation-as permitted by the tax laws-
really has no true relationship to the life of the item depreciated-either useful or otherwise."
Disney I, 327 F. Supp. at 191.
51. Id.; I.R.C. § 168(e)(l)-(4) (1982). The limitations were drafted narrowly, mainly to
exclude property in which the taxpayer had an interest before January 1, 1981 from applica-
tion of the rapid ACRS depreciation method.
52. The House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on the Treasury Department's
proposed tax shelter and other tax reform provisions on February 22 and 28, 1984. H.R. REP.
No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. -, 1025 n.1, reprinted in 1984(3) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 697, 711 n.1.
53. Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D.-Ill.), Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, noted three tax reform goals: first, "repair" of certain Code sections to reflect
higher interest and inflation rates, and reduction of tax incentives that had proven ineffectual
or too expensive for the results achieved; second, the need to raise sufficient revenue, and in an
equitable manner; and third, "to demonstrate to the Nation that Congress is willing and able
to confront such problems." The Chairman characterized the 1984 tax reform act as "a
start-a downpayment." 130 CONG. REC. H7085, (daily ed. June 27, 1984), reprinted in
1984(3) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2140-41.
On the same day, Senator Robert Dole (R.-Kan.), Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, characterized the thrust of the legislation as "deficit reduction." "Eighty percent of the
tax package is closing loopholes." The Senator echoed President Reagan's concern, as ex-
pressed in a letter dated June 27, 1984 (reprinted in the Record), that the Act contain "meas-
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in tax shelters,54 and to close tax loopholes in the interest of a more
favorable public image for our tax system,55 Congress acted on legislation
proposed by Senator R. Dole, Chairman of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, to foreclose any further application of the ACRS system to motion
picture and videotape production costs. 56 The proposed new Code sub-
section 168(e)(5) consisted of a brief declarative sentence: "[t]he term
'recovery property' shall not include any motion picture film or video
tape."57
Seven days after Senator Dole proposed this new subsection
168(e)(5), Senator Pete Wilson (R.-Cal.) protested from the Senate floor
that "without any public notice to impacted tax payers and no discussion
of the provision in the [Senate Finance] committee, the Finance Commit-
tee has retroactively repealed ACRS for motion pictures. No adequate
transitional rule is provided."5" The Senator complained that "[n]othing
generally available to taxpayers, including the committee press release
announcing its decisions, gave any indication that movies would lose the
right to claim ACRS. The result became known only when the statutory
language became available." 59
Noting that his proposed floor amendment for a transitional rule for
films placed in service in 1984 had been "cleared with the majority, the
ures to close tax loopholes of questionable fairness." 130 CONG. REC. S8373 (daily ed. June 27,
1984), reprinted in 1984(3) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2140-41.
54. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSALS RE-
LATING TO TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER TAX-MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS, SCHEDULED FOR
HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON FEBRUARY 22 AND 28, 1984
(Joint Comm. Print 1984) ["TAX SHELTERS"]. The staff noted that with respect to factors
influencing the supply of tax shelters, it was the combination of ITC, ACRS and debt financ-
ing, not one of these alone, that caused the value of an investment's deductions to exceed the
present value of its pre-tax income. Tax deductions that greatly exceed pre-tax income en-
courage asset users to lease from partnerships, where the owners (often limited partners) are
better able to use the tax write-offs and credits. TAX SHELTERS at 10.
The staff also noted that the growth of tax shelters may have had an adverse impact on
tax system efficiency, since shelter activity "has significantly reduced the tax base over time,
which has contributed both to higher deficits and the need for higher tax rates." TAX SHEL-
TERS at 13. See also, Abusive Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
See Tax Incentives, supra note 38 at 860, 867 for a discussion of how to control film tax
shelter abuse without impairing desirable production and employment incentives. Two com-
mon outside investor (tax shelter) financing methods are "negative pickup" and "service part-
nership." Most abuses occurred with the negative pickup method. Tax Incentives at 860.
55. TAX SHELTERS, supra note 54, at 13.
56. Dole (and Long) Floor Amendment No. 2902, § 173, to H.R. 2163, 130 CONG. REC.
S3921-4070 (daily ed. April 5, 1984). See S3923, 3975.
57. 130 CONG. REC. S3975 (daily ed. April 5, 1984).
58. 130 CONG. REC. S4543 (daily ed. April 12, 1984).
59. Id.
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minority, and the Treasury," Senator Wilson was able to persuade the
Senate to agree to it.6' This amendment appeared in substantially the
same form in the bill subsequently approved by the House of Representa-
tives, and then signed into law by President Reagan on July 19, 1984.61
But this concession was small consolation-among users of long-term
investment capital, film production companies were in effect singled out
by the Ninety-eighth Congress for the harsh treatment entailed by out-
right abolition (rather than modification) of a favorable tax provision.
This was unfortunate, since the Senate Finance Committee estimated
that abolishing ACRS for films would "increase budget receipts by less
than $10 million annually."
61
In introducing his transitional rule, Senator Wilson observed that in
abolishing ACRS for motion pictures, the Finance Committee had "sum-
marily repeal[ed] the Ninth Circuit Disney case."'63 The Finance Com-
60. Id. The purpose of the transitional rule was to protect from the Tax Reform Act's
retroactive effect any film producer who had elected five-year ACRS treatment for a film
placed in service prior to the end of 1984 if he expended more than 20% of the production
costs before March 16, 1984.
61. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Div. A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, § 113(c)(2)(A), 98 Stat. 494, 635-38. CALENDARS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGIS. 10-29, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. July 23,
1984).
62. COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, S.
PRT. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (Comm. Print 1984) ["FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT"].
The Joint Committee on Taxation did not characterize the application of ACRS to films
as a tax shelter abuse, but only as a technical misunderstanding to be corrected in the 1984 tax
reform legislation:
Under E[conomic] R[ecovery] T[ax] A[ct of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34], personal
property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation which is placed in
service by a taxpayer after December 31, 1980, generally qualifies as recovery prop-
erty, eligible for depreciation under ACRS. Most personal property qualifying as
recovery property can be depreciated, on an accelerated basis, over 3 or 5 years.
However, under section 168(c)(2), recovery property includes only tangible
property. Furthermore, under section 168(e), recovery property, for depreciation
purposes, generally does not include tangible depreciable property which the tax-
payer elects to depreciate under the unit-of-production method, the income forecast
method, or any other method of depreciation not expressed in a term of years.
The language of prior law was unclear as to whether films (including video
tapes) were generally to be treated as tangible personal property. While it was held
that negatives of feature films qualified as tangible personal property for regular in-
vestment credit purposes (see, e.g., Walt Disney Productions v. United States, 480
F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974), Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(f) is
to the contrary.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS
OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, JT. COMM. PRINT 41, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 336-37
(1984).
63. 130 CONG. REC. S4543 (daily ed. April 12, 1984).
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mittee Report accompanying proposed section 168(e)(5) noted that the
Ninth Circuit held in 1973 that negatives of feature films qualified as
tangible personal property in Walt Disney Productions v. United States
[Disney I], and that the Supreme Court had denied certiorari in 1974,
even though the relevant Treasury Regulation [1.48-1 (f)] stated that mo-
tion picture or television film or video tapes were intangible.' 4
Senator Wilson's remark from the floor about Congress's summary
repeal of Disney III through new Code section 168(e)(5) 61 was not
strictly accurate for two reasons. First, the Disney cases only addressed
the issue of tangibility with respect to the ITC, not with respect to allow-
able depreciation methods. The Congress has analogized from one to the
other. Second, new Code subsection 168(e)(5) itself does not address tan-
gibility or ITC. While it does deny the five-year recovery property status
as set forth in section 168 to film master negatives, the new subsection
says nothing about the applicability to motion pictures of the accelerated,
declining balance or sum of the years' digits depreciation methods avail-
able for tangible property under subsection 167(b).66 As enacted, the
Tax Reform Act of 1984 leaves section 167(c) accelerated methods open
to films and sound recordings.
Nevertheless, Senator Wilson's remark was prophetic in light of leg-
islative developments during in the First Session of the Ninety-ninth
Congress. In March 1985 Rep. D. Rostenkowski, Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, and former Senate Finance Com-
mittee Chairman Senator R. Dole introduced the companion bills H.R.
1800 and S. 814, the "Technical Corrections Bill of 1984. 167 In identical
language, the bills amend Internal Revenue Code section 167(c) by ad-
ding at the end the following new sentence: ". . . any motion picture
film, video tape, or sound recording shall be treated as intangible prop-
erty.",68 The accompanying Joint Committee on Taxation report ex-
plains that "[t]hus, accelerated depreciation methods available under
section 167(c) only with respect to tangible property [i.e. declining bal-
ance, sum of the years-digits and comparable methods] are not available.
64. FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 62, at 467.
For the Senator, tangibility with respect to ITC was most likely the equivalent to tangibil-
ity for depreciation purposes. Rationally one could expect them to be treated in parallel fash-
ion. One could also hope for this from the viewpoint of tax simplicity.
65. New subsection 168(e)(5) states that "[tihe term 'recovery property' shall not include
any motion picture film or video tape." I.R.C. § 168(e)(5) (West Supp. 1986).
66. I.R.C. § 167(b) (1982).
67. 131 CONG. REC. H1630 (daily ed. March 28, 1985); 131 CONG. REC. S3687 (daily ed.
March 28, 1985).
68. The amending language is found in § 107(c) of both bills. See supra note 4.
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However, the income forecast method or similar methods of depreciation
are available.", 69 Where the owner or owners of a sound recording have
failed to elect the three-year recovery property treatment under section
48(r), they likewise will find accelerated tangible depreciation options
foreclosed.
It would appear that the Congress, or at least the two influential tax
committee members, are moving toward endorsement of the Treasury's
consistently held position, articulated first in Treasury Regulations sec-
tion 1.48-1(07° , and then in the Disney cases 7 and the EMI case7 . Film
and sound recording masters are intangible property, rather than tangi-
ble "machines" producing a copyrighted product. The persistent Treas-
ury may finally obtain through Congress what the federal courts, in
eleven years of litigation against the entertainment industry, denied it as
a matter of legal principle.
Paradoxically, in the 1984 Tax Reform Act the Congress, once
again acting on provisions supplied by the Senate Finance Committee,
73
granted the sound recording industry a depreciation option quite similar
to the one just denied the film industry. The taxpayer was given the
option to elect the ITC and a three-year ACRS recovery period in which
to depreciate the sound recording master tape through new Code subsec-
tion 48(r).74
Senators Wilson and Cranston suggested a floor amendment 75 to the
proposed new subsection 48(r), to include certain contingent costs,
residuals and royalties that the Finance Committee had excluded from
ITC and three-year recovery property treatment.76 When Senator H.
Metzenbaum (D.-Ohio) opposed this amendment,77 Senator Cranston
pointed out that under the existing 1984 Tax Reform Bill language, rec-
69. JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS
ACT OF 1985 (H.R. 1800 AND S. 814), JT. COMM. PRINT 7, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1985).
70. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
71. Disney I, Disney II and Disney III.
72. EMI North America Holdings v. United States, 675 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1982).
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. One might have expected the sound recording recovery property provision to appear
somewhere in § 168, which sets forth the ACRS system, or even in § 280(c), which defines
sound recordings, instead of § 48, which deals almost exclusively with the ITC. The Joint
Committee, however, took pains to state that since -sound recordings do not qualify as recov-
ery property unless an election is made under section 48(r)(1) (relating to treating a sound
recording as 3-year property). Thus, their costs cannot be recovered under ACRS." JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1985
(H.R. 1800 AND S. 814), JT. COMM. PRINT 7, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1985).
75. Amendment No. 2986. 130 CONG. REC. S4491 (daily ed. April 12, 1984).
76. Id. at S4491.
77. Id. at S4492.
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ord companies that specialize in developing new talent by recording as
yet unrecognized artists were at a disadvantage. This type of company
customarily makes a modest "trial effort" with a new artist, and will only
issue a "considerably greater release" after some promising initial accept-
ance. He warned that "if our amendment is not adopted, smaller compa-
nies will be at a disadvantage as against those who are now famous and
who have no difficulty with new recordings."
'7 8
Senator Cranston stated that:
[allowing these contingent costs for the rerelease would] even
the playing field for the record industry, permit[ting] the
smaller firms to compete effectively against the giants. [The
proposed amendment would] keep the door open [for the]
many, many musicians in my State of California who work day
and night for the opportunity for recognition.7 9
The Congress agreed with Wilson and Cranston; the substantial
equivalent of their floor amendment was passed into law with the rest of
the 1984 Tax Reform Act.8 °
Ironically, the appeals Cranston made on behalf of small recording
producers and hardworking performers apply equally well to independ-
ent motion picture production, as a recent Note has documented.
8 1
In a 1982 case, EMI North America Holdings v. United States, the
Ninth Circuit had extended, without elaboration, the tangibility rationale
developed in the Disney film cases to sound recordings.8 2 There the court
applied the "long-established"8 3 Disney precedents to EMI's dispute with
the IRS over ITC for capital expenditures incurred in producing master
sound recording tapes. Without further discussion, in EMI the court
held that "[b]ecause master prints of movies and master sound tapes are
functionally identical, no principled distinction can be drawn between
the authorities cited 4 and the present controversy. 85
The absence of a principled distinction that could have justified the
grant of three-year recovery property status to sound recording masters
78. Id. at S4491.
79. Id. at S4492 (statement of Sen. Cranston).
80. It now appears as I.R.C. § 48(r)(6)(C) (West Supp. 1986).
81. Tax Incentives, supra note 38.
82. EMI North America Holdings v. United States, 675 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1982).
83. 675 F.2d at 1069.
84. The court cited Bing Crosby, Disney III, Disney I, and Texas Instruments. Id.
85. The Congress acted consistently with this court's perspective when it exempted both
films and sound recordings from the rules for predominant use outside the United States
(§ 48(a)(2)) and for amounts at risk (§§ 48(c)(8)-(9), 465) in the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 1 13(a)(3) (films) and 113(b)(3) (sound recordings), 98 Stat. 494, 635-
38.
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and the simultaneous denial of five-year recovery property status to film
masters was not raised on the Senate floor or in the committee prints. As
a result, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 left the entertainment industry with
an uneasy, unarticulated compromise. Now motion pictures and video-
tapes could only be depreciated under section 167 and not 168, but the
accelerated methods set forth in section 167(b) were still available (hence
the "tin Oscar").8 6 Nevertheless, sound recordings were now guaranteed
the very favorable three-year depreciation schedule by new subsection
48(r) (hence the "bronze Grammy").
s7
How long this compromise lasts currently depends on the Ninety-
ninth Congress's feeling about film industry provisions set forth in the
companion House and Senate bills H.R. 1800 and S. 81488, the "Techni-
cal Corrections Bill of 1984." Will this Congress, mindful that the film
industry has lost five-year ACRS in the Ninety-eighth's Tax Reform Act
of 1984, now preclude use of the accelerated forms of depreciation avail-
able under section 167(b)?89 The sound recording industry would face
this same loss of all accelerated depreciation methods whenever the
three-year recovery property election is not made.9"
The 'Tax Reform Act of 1985," pending bill H.R. 3838,91 would
scale back the depreciation benefits available under ACRS uniformly
across major industries. Nevertheless, passage of the "Technical Correc-
tions Bill" would force the entertainment industry, unlike any other ma-
jor American industry, into an unwholesome choice between the modest
straight line depreciation benefits available under section 167(a), and the
inherently problematic income forecast method available under section
167(b).
Consequently, all film and recording production companies would
experience a loss of financial planning flexibility and would lose ground
relative to other American industries in competing for investment capi-
tal. Within the film industry, the problem of concentration of production
in the hands of a few major studios, an antitrust problem the government
has addressed since the late 1930s, would be exacerbated.9 2
86. Supra note 1.
87. Supra note 2.
88. See supra notes 4, 67 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 6.
90. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
91. H.R. 3838, § 201, 131 CONG. REC. H12597 (daily ed. December 17, 1985).
92. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1947). In 1947, after two decades
of litigation the Supreme Court affirmed a consent decree between the Justice Department and
the major studios. The decree required that they divest themselves of their theaters, while
allowing them to retain their production and distribution operations. It was hoped that this
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The "Tax Reform Bill of 1985," H.R. 3838, also contains provisions
abolishing the ITC in its entirety.93 If the 1985 Tax Reform Bill and the
Technical Corrections Bill become law, the Treasury's victory over the
motion picture and sound recording industries, especially the small pro-
duction companies, will have been made complete in one legislative
session.
Raymond L. Towne*
divestiture would lead to new entrants into the production field. Tax Incentives, supra note 38
at 847.
Since the 1976 Act, "independent production has declined fifty-eight percent while major
studio production has remained relatively stable." Id. See Table at 864. Now that independ-
ent film producers have lost five-year ACRS in the 1984 Act and stand to lose more in pending
1986 legislation, the same antitrust conditions which the government sought to remedy in 1947
may exist again by 1987.
93. H.R. 3838, § 211, 131 CONG. REC. H12597 (daily ed. December 17, 1985).
In December 1985 Rep. J. Duncan (R.-Tenn.) proposed H.R. 3879, an "amendment in
the nature of a substitute" for H.R. 3838. 131 CONG. REC. H12736. This "Republican substi-
tute," 131 CONG. REC. H12801, for the Ways and Means bill H.R. 3838 sponsored by chair-
man Rostenkowski, was soundly defeated, H12824, immediately before the House passed H.R
3838 on a voice vote, H12826. Perhaps H.R. 3879 would have fared better had Rep. Duncan
garnered film and sound recording industry support for his attempt to preserve the ITC for
"qualified domestically produced ... tangible property which. . . is manufacturing [or] pro-
duction. . . machinery or equipment," H12752.
* Thanks to Professor Joesph Sliskovich and student Mary Herndon of Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles, for their help in the preparation of this note.
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